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The effects of  mental illness can sometimes make it impossible for the state to prove theculpability requirements for an offence. For example, an actor who hallucinates that a
knife is a clothes brush may not have the required culpability for homicide if  he kills
someone thinking that he is brushing lint from the victim’s chest. Similarly, mental illness can
mitigate murder to a lesser form or to manslaughter if  the actor killed under the influence
of  an ‘extreme mental or emotional disturbance’. Finally, mental illness can form the basis for
a general excuse, for example, the insanity defence. Unlike the other two doctrines, the
insanity defence operates without regard to – that is, despite the defendant’s satisfaction of
– the elements of  the offence definition (indeed, the excuse is only necessary if  the
defendant otherwise satisfies the offence requirements). In order to successfully raise the
insanity defence, the actor need only satisfy the conditions set out in the defence provision.
1 General excuse of insanity
The insanity defence reflects the standard structure and requirements common in disability
excuses, namely, that a disability – in this instance, mental disease or defect – causes an
excusing condition, that is, a particular kind of  dysfunction in relation to the offence conduct.
A. The required disAbiliTy: menTAl diseAse or defecT
In this context, ‘mental disease or defect’ is a legal concept, not a medical one, and is thus for
the jury rather than medical experts to resolve – though the jury will no doubt be influenced
by the expert witnesses that they hear. Many experts testifying as to whether the defendant
suffers from a mental disease or defect will rely on the classification system contained in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of  the American Psychiatric Association (APA), now in its fifth
edition (DSM-5).1 The APA gives the following definition of  ‘mental disorder’:
A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant
disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that
reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental
processes underlying mental functioning. Mental disorders are usually associated
with significant distress or disability in social, occupational, or other important
activities. An expectable or culturally approved response to a common stressor
1 APA, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of  Mental Disorders xii–xl 5th edn (American Psychological Publishing
2013) (hereafter DSM-5).
or loss, such as the death of  a loved one, is not a mental disorder. Socially deviant
behavior (e.g., political, religious, or sexual) and conflicts that are primarily
between the individual and society are not mental disorders unless the deviance
or conflict results from a dysfunction in the individual, as described above.2
Intoxication can cause mental dysfunction, but it is commonly excluded as a basis for the
insanity defence, because it is not a form of  mental disease or defect.3 It is dealt with instead
under the law’s special intoxication defence. The habitual and excessive use of  intoxicants,
however, may cause a mental disease with resulting dysfunction apart from the intoxication,
and this mental disease can be the basis for an insanity defence.4 Addiction, for example,
has been recognised as a mental disease.5
The insanity defence also typically excludes any ‘abnormality manifested only by
repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct’.6 In other words, being a habitual
criminal is not in itself  a sufficient indication of  a cognizable disability. Such an abnormality
may be a mental disease for clinical treatment purposes, but to recognise it as a mental
disease for the purposes of  the insanity defence would generate results inconsistent with the
theory of  excuses as serving to exculpate blameless offenders. Such habitual criminality by
itself  may be fully volitional conduct, and thus fully blameworthy.
b. The required excusinG condiTions: AlTernATive formulATions
It is not enough for the defence that an actor suffers from a mental disease or defect, even
one that causes some dysfunction. To be held blameless, the actor’s mental illness must
cause effects so strong that it would not be reasonable to expect the actor to have avoided
the criminal law violation. This excusing condition, or required effect of  the mental illness, has
been formulated in several different ways for the insanity defence. The most significant tests
include: the McNaghten test; the McNaghten test plus the ‘irresistible impulse’ test; the
Durham ‘product’ test; the Model Penal Code formulation; and the more recent federal
insanity formulation.
In McNaghten’s Case, the House of  Lords held that an actor has a defence of  insanity if
‘at the time of  committing the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of  the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of  the act he was doing, or,
if  he did know it, [he] did not know he was doing what was wrong.’7 This 1843 formulation has been
adopted and maintained by many US jurisdictions today, as detailed below.
As the quote indicates, this test can be satisfied in two ways: the mental disability may
prevent the defendant from understanding (1) the nature or (2) the wrongfulness of  his or
her conduct. For both instances, the focus is on the defendant’s impaired perception or
cognition. The McNaghten test was an advance over prior case law, which set the standard
for the defence as having no more understanding than ‘an infant, a brute, or a wild beast’.8
McNaghten gave the jury specific criteria to focus on rather than vague analogies.
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2 DSM-5 20.
3 Model Penal Code § 2.08(3).
4 See e.g. United States v Lyons 731 F 2d 243 (5th Cir 1984) (en banc) (evidence on lack of  substantial capacity to
appreciate criminality of  conduct due to physiological impairment due to drug addiction can be submitted to
jury); People v Griggs 17 Cal 2d 621 (1941) (insanity from long continued intoxication must be treated similarly
by the court as insanity produced by another cause).
5 See DSM-5 485–87. Some cases, however, expressly reject the notion that addiction can qualify an actor for
an insanity defence. See e.g. United States v Moore 486 F 2d 1139 (DC Cir 1973).
6 Model Penal Code § 4.01(2).
7 McNaghten’s Case [1843] 8 Eng Rep 718, 722 [author’s emphasis added].
8 Amold’s Case [1724] 16 How State Tr 695, 765.
As early as 1887, the McNaghten test was criticised as failing to reflect advances in the
behavioural sciences. Mental illness, it was observed, can remove the power to choose as well
as the knowledge of  one’s situation or of  right and wrong.9 To permit a defence in cases
involving loss of  the power to choose, some jurisdictions supplemented the McNaghten
test with what is sometimes described as the ‘irresistible impulse’ test.10 Under this
formulation – under which a ‘control prong’ is said to be added to McNaghten’s ‘cognitive
prong’ of  the insanity defence – an actor obtains the defence if  he or she satisfies the
McNaghten test or:
(1) if, by reason of  the duress of  such mental disease, he had so far lost the power
to choose between the right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act in question, as
that his free agency was at the time destroyed; (2) and if, at the same time, the
alleged crime was so connected with such mental disease, in the relation of  cause
and effect, as to have been the product of  it solely.11
The McNaghten-plus-irresistible-impulse test was criticised in turn as not fully reflecting
still more recent advances in the behavioural sciences. For example, the court in Durham v
United States observed that mental dysfunctions, of  both the cognitive and control types, are
always a matter of  degree and are not, as was previously thought, absolute in their effect.12
Further, the court found that the McNaghten and irresistible-impulse tests improperly focus
on particular symptoms rather than on the key question of  whether the mental illness,
whatever its nature, had the effect of  causing the offence. Durham then articulated a ‘product’ test
for insanity, under which an accused ‘is not criminally responsible if  his unlawful act was
the product of  mental disease or mental defect’.13
Durham, however, was widely criticised as overstating the grounds of  exculpation. The
critics argued that it should not suffice that the mental illness is a ‘but for’ cause of  the
offence; the mental illness must also cause a degree of  impairment sufficiently severe that
it renders the defendant blameless for the offence – a reasonable person suffering this kind
and degree of  dysfunction could not reasonably have been expected to have avoided the
violation. The product test was adopted in only a few jurisdictions, and arguably remains in
use in only one.14
In United States v Brawner,15 the Court of  Appeal for the District of  Columbia Circuit
overruled its earlier decision in Durham, rejected the Durham ‘product test’ and adopted
instead the test contained in Model Penal Code § 4.01(1) (also known as the American Law
Institute or ALI test):
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if  at the time of  such conduct as
a result of  mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality [wrongfulness]16 of  his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of  law.
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9 Parson v State 2 So 854 (AL 1887).
10 The phrase ‘irresistible impulse’ is something of  a misnomer. As the quotation in the text illustrates, nothing
in the defence requires that the ‘duress of  mental illness’ be impulsive. It may be, and frequently is, a long
process that both creates the mental illness and has the mental illness cause the criminal conduct.
11 Parson (n 9) 866–67 [author’s emphasis added]
12 Durham v United States 214 F 2d 862 (DC Cir 1954).
13 Ibid 874.
14 State v Shackford 506 A 2d 315 (NH 1986) (holding that the insanity test is a matter ‘to be weighed by the jury
upon the question whether the act was the offspring of  insanity’, quoting State v Jones 50 NH 369, 398–99
(1871)); State v Pike 49 NH 399 (1870).
15 471 F 2d 969 (DC Cir 1972).
16 The alternative language provided by the Code – ‘criminality [wrongfulness]’ – arises from disagreement over
whether the test should look to the actor’s awareness that the conduct is legally wrong or that it is morally
wrong. For a discussion of  the issue, see e.g. State v Crenshaw 659 P 2d 488 (WA 1983).
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This formulation concedes that there are degrees of  impairment, as Durham had
emphasised, but also requires a minimum degree of  impairment: namely, the actor must
‘lack substantial capacity’ to behave properly. The Model Penal Code test reverts to the
structure of  the McNaghten-plus-irresistible-impulse test in specifically noting that the
dysfunction may affect either cognitive or control capacities. It differs from McNaghten-
plus-irresistible-impulse, however, in that the earlier formulation would appear to require
absolute dysfunction, i.e. the total absence of  knowledge of  criminality or the total loss of
power to choose.17 The Model Penal Code test, in contrast, requires only that the actor lack
‘substantial capacity’ to control his conduct or ‘appreciate’ its criminality. As detailed further
below, the test has gained wide acceptance, rivalling the popularity of  the McNaghten and
McNaghten-plus-irresistible-impulse formulations.
Another formulation of  the insanity defence, which was considered but rejected by the
ALI, calls for the jury’s general assessment of  an actor’s responsibility and blameworthiness
for the offence. It would provide the defence if  the actor, because of  mental disease or defect,
lacked sufficient capacity to be ‘justly held responsible’ for his or her conduct.18 The approach
is similar to the Model Penal Code’s approach in other contexts, where the Code’s rules
explicitly call on the decision-maker for a normative judgment. Its causation test, for example,
asks the jury to decide whether a result’s occurrence is too remote or accidental ‘to have a [just]
bearing on the actor’s liability or on the gravity of  his offence’.19 Such an open formulation
was rejected in the insanity context, however, because it was thought that the jury could and
should be given greater guidance. The version ultimately included in the Code focused the
jury’s attention on the nature and effect of  the dysfunction – with specific reference to
cognitive or control dysfunction – and avoided having a jury incorporate considerations of
general sympathy (or bias) that might slip in under the broader ‘justice’ standard.
Some jurisdictions that previously adopted the Model Penal Code test have cut back on
it. For example, the federal insanity statute, which was enacted by Congress to replace the
holding in Brawner, noted above, which adopted the ALI test, follows the ALI’s ‘appreciates’
language, rather than McNaghten’s ‘know’ language, thereby seeming to allow exculpation
for degrees of  cognitive dysfunction short of  complete loss.20 On the other hand, the
federal statute drops the ‘lacks substantial capacity’ language, which makes it closer to the
apparently absolute requirement of  McNaghten. Most importantly, the federal formulation
drops the control prong of  the defence altogether, reverting to the single cognitive prong.
This reflects scepticism as to whether behavioural scientists can measure an actor’s degree
of  control impairment and as to whether jurors can understand testimony about, or
effectively judge, a defendant’s degree of  impairment.21
A few jurisdictions have abolished the insanity defence (but continue to allow mental
disease or defect to provide a defence if  it negates a required offence culpability element,
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17 Some writers have observed that the irresistible impulse test may not be as absolute in application as it appears.
By requiring that the actor has no power to choose, it certainly urges the jury to be demanding in the level of
dysfunction that they will require, but it seems unusual, if  not impossible, that an actor would lose all power
to choose. Typically, control impairments make an actor’s decisions to remain law-abiding more difficult, but
rarely take away all decision. See Model Penal Code § 4.01, comment 3 (1985) (explaining that a workable test
calling for complete loss of  ability to know or control is not possible and that such a test would impose
unrealistic restriction on scope of  proper inquiry).
18 This proposal appears as alternative (a) to para (1) of  Model Penal Code § 4.01 (Tentative Draft No 4, 1955).
19 Model Penal Code § 2.03(2)(b) and (3)(b). Similar instances of  broad language calling for a normative judgment
can be found in Model Penal Code §§ 2.02(2)(c) and (d) (defining recklessness and negligence), 2.12(2) (defining
de minimis infraction), 3.02(1)(a) (defining lesser evils defence) and 2.09(1) (defining duress defence).
20 18 USC § 17.
21 See e.g. Lyons (n 4).
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as discussed in Part 2 below).22 Constitutional challenges to such abolition have been
successful in some cases,23 but not in others.24 Whether or not the federal or state
constitutions bar it, abolition is a questionable policy. To the extent that the criminal law
claims to express conclusions about an actor’s blameworthiness – the characteristic that
traditionally has distinguished criminal law from civil law – it cannot impose criminal
liability and punishment on clearly insane offenders without destroying its moral credibility.
If  society has a need to protect itself  against dangerous persons who are predicted to
commit future crimes, it can and should do so. Typically, dangerous persons are
blameworthy offenders. In the unusual case where an offender is dangerous yet blameless,
as is true for some insane offenders, civil commitment is an alternative means of  protecting
the community while retaining the criminal law’s moral credibility.25
No single insanity formulation is dominant. Twenty-two of  the 52 jurisdictions apply
the traditional McNaghten test,26 with three adding the irresistible-impulse element.27 Of
the 17 jurisdictions adopting a control prong, 14 have done so by adopting the somewhat
broader Model Penal Code (ALI) formulation. Thus, just under a third of  the states with
insanity defences have adopted the ALI formulation in its entirety.28 Four jurisdictions have
no insanity defence, though they continue to allow mental illness to negate an offence
culpability element.29 One state adopts what appears to be something close to the Durham
product test.30
The most prominent alternative formulations of  the insanity defence are summarised in
Table 1 overleaf.
c. AddinG A verdicT of ‘GuilTy buT menTAlly ill’
In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of  jurisdictions adopted a verdict of  ‘Guilty But Mentally
Ill’ (GBMI).31 The verdict replaces the insanity defence in only a few states. More
frequently, it provides the trier of  fact with an additional verdict in cases where mental
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22 See Idaho Code § 18-207; Kan Stat Ann § 22-3220; Mont Code Ann § 46-14-102; Utah Code Ann § 76-2-
305(1); See, generally, Paul H Robinson, Criminal Law Defences vol 2 (West Group 1984) § 173(a) n 5.
23 See e.g. State v Strasburg 110 P 1020 (WA 1910).
24 See e.g. State v Korell 690 P 2d 992 (MT 1984).
25 See Paul H Robinson, ‘Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice’ (2001)
114 Harvard Law Review 1429; Paul H Robinson, ‘The Criminal-Civil Distinction and Dangerous Blameless
Offenders’ (1993) 83 Journal of  Criminal Law and Criminology 693.
26 Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 13-502; Cal Penal Code § 25; Colo Rev Stat Ann § 16-8-101; Fla Stat Ann § 775.027; Ga
Code Ann § 16-3-2; Iowa Code Ann § 701.4; La Rev Stat Ann § 14; Minn Stat Ann § 611.026; Roundtree v State
568 So 2d 1173 (MS 1990); Mo Ann Stat § 552.030 (modifying the standard language slightly to ‘incapable of
knowing and appreciating’); State v Harms 650 N W 2d 481 (NE 2002); N J Stat Ann § 2C:4-1; Ohio Rev Code
Ann § 2901.01; Okla Stat Ann tit 21 § 152; 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 314; SC Code Ann § 17-24-10; SD Codified
Laws § 22-1-2; Tex Penal Code Ann § 8.01; Price v Commonwealth 323 SE 2d 106 (VA 1984); Wash Rev Code
Ann § 9A.12.010.
27 State v White 270 P 2d 727 (NM 1954).
28 Ark Code Ann § 5-2-312; Conn Gen Stat Ann § 53a-13; Patton v US 782 A 2d 305 (DC 2001); Haw Rev Stat
Ann § 704-400; Ky Rev Stat Ann § 504.020; Md Code Ann, Crim Proc § 3-109; Commonwealth v Brown 434 NE
2d 973 (MA 1982); Mich Comp Laws Ann § 768.21a; Or Rev Stat § 161.295; State v Johnson 399 A 2d 469 (RI
1979); Vt Stat Ann Tit 13 § 4801; State v Samples 328 SE 2d 191 (WV 1985); Wis Stat Ann § 971.15; Wyo Stat
Ann § 7-11-304.
29 Idaho Code § 18-207; Kan Stat Ann § 22-3220; Mont Code Ann § 45-2-101; Utah Code Ann § 76-2-305.
30 State v Shackford 506 A 2d 315 (NH 1986).
31 See Lisa A Callahan et al, ‘Measuring the Effects of  the Guilty But Mentally Ill (GMI) Verdict: Georgia’s 1982
Reform’ (1992) 16 Law and Human Behavior 447; Ronnie Mackay and Jerry Kopelman, ‘The Operation of
the “Guilty But Mentally Ill” Verdict in Pennsylvania’ (1988) 16 Journal of  Psychiatry and Law 247, 248.
illness is an issue. The special verdict may be returned where a defendant is mentally ill, but
where his or her mental illness is insufficient to provide either an insanity defence or a
defence of  mental illness negating an offence element (discussed in part 2). Following a
GBMI verdict, the court typically has the same sentencing options that would follow from
a typical ‘guilty’ verdict. GBMI convicts must be examined by psychiatrists before beginning
to serve the sentence and, if  found to be in need of  treatment, are then imprisoned in a
criminal mental health facility. In most jurisdictions, however, such evaluation and treatment
occurs for all convicted offenders, not just those receiving a GBMI verdict,32 in which case
a GBMI verdict is indistinguishable from a guilty verdict in its practical effect. (As noted
above, similar civil commitment required-examination procedures also often exist for
defendants acquitted under a Not Guilty by Reason of  Insanity (NGRI) verdict.) In fact,
although the GBMI verdict may seem designed to help mentally ill convicts, one of  the few
practical distinctions between GBMI convicts and typical sane convicts is that the GBMI
convicts tend to receive longer sentences.33
The GBMI verdict raises some significant concerns. First, one must question why the
fact-finder in a criminal trial is an appropriate body to determine whether an offender is in
need of  a psychiatric examination. The expertise of  the jury is in finding the facts of  past
events and in applying that community’s notion of  blameworthiness. The need for
psychiatric treatment is a clinical issue, appropriate for prison psychiatrists, for example. It
northern ireland legal quarterly 65(2)234
32 See, for example, Cal Penal Code § 2684 (prescribing terms for transfer to state hospital of  mentally ill
prisoners); DC Code Ann § 24–302; Mich Comp Laws Ann §§ 330.2001–330.2006; 50 Pa Cons Stat Ann
§ 4408; see also National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Corrections 184
(1973).
33 See Henry J Steadman et al, Before and after Hinckley: Evaluating Insanity Defence Reform (Guildford Press 1993) 8.
This is likely due to a suspicion that mentally ill individuals are unusually dangerous and need to be
incapacitated to prevent them from committing more crimes.
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Table 1: Alternative formulations of the insanity defence
is not within the lay judgment of  the jury,34 and asking the jury to undertake such an inquiry
can distract and confuse it in its task of  assessing blameworthiness.
A second concern arises from an analysis of  the legislative history for the GBMI verdict.
The history suggests that the verdict was not even designed to perform such a psychiatric
screening function, but rather arose as a device to reduce NGRI acquittals after
constitutional mandates limited the use of  civil commitment to preventively detain
disturbed offenders.35 The limitations on civil commitment were thought to create a risk of
dangerously insane acquittees being released back into the community. Adding the GBMI
verdict combats this perceived danger indirectly, not by loosening civil commitment
standards, but by diverting mentally ill offenders from civil commitment to the criminal
justice system. A jury choosing between an NGRI verdict and a GBMI verdict may select
the latter, not because the jury finds the defendant blameworthy, but because the latter
verdict seems to guarantee what may be the obvious need for treatment and confinement. 
The difficulty with the GBMI verdict is that it invites jurors to consider matters unrelated
to blameworthiness at a time when blameworthiness should be the sole issue before them.
Moreover, the verdict plays on jurors’ ignorance of  the consequences of  an NGRI verdict
(or a standard ‘guilty’ verdict), encouraging the misperception that a GBMI verdict is the only
way to incapacitate dangerously mentally ill persons while also providing necessary
psychological treatment. (Adding to the potential confusion is the likelihood that the jury will
inadvertently confuse the statutory definition of  ‘mental illness’, relevant to the GBMI
verdict, and the definition of  ‘mental disease or defect’, relevant to the insanity defence.) The
use of  such an improper compromise verdict may do as much to undermine the insanity
defence as total abolition would. If  effective abolition is the objective, abolishing the insanity
test openly would better further the interests of  informed debate and reform.
The underlying purpose of  adding the GBMI verdict, reducing insanity acquittals, is
driven by fears that the insanity defence is granted too often and possibly subject to abuse.
Yet the empirical evidence suggests that such fears are ill-founded. For example, people
generally believe, inaccurately, that the insanity defence is a commonly offered defence in
criminal trials: one study found that people estimate that 38 per cent of  all defendants
charged with crime plead NGRI.36 In reality, an insanity plea is exceedingly rare, raised in a
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34 Referrals for such professional evaluation of  offenders who may need treatment can be done more effectively
and efficiently by the court after receiving the pre-sentence report. Indeed, several jurisdictions have established
specific post-trial procedures to provide treatment for mentally ill offenders who are sentenced to prison.
35 See e.g. Donald H J Hermann and Yvonne S Sor, ‘Convicting or Confining? Alternative Directions in Insanity
Law Reform: Guilty But Mentally Ill Versus New Rules for Release of  Insanity Acquittees’ (1983) BYU L Rev
499, 582 (‘The rationale for the GBMI verdict stems from a legislative concern that the insanity defense is too
easily proved, while the abolition of  automatic commitment of  insanity acquittees in some states has made civil
commitment of  persons found NGRI more difficult.’); see also People v Ramsey 375 NW 2d 297 (MI 1985) (a
major purpose of  GBMI statute is to lessen the number of  persons relieved of  all criminal responsibility by way
of  NGRI verdict); State v Neely 819 P 2d 249, 252 (NM 1991) (suggesting that legislature’s purpose in enacting
GBMI statute was ‘to reduce the number of  improper or inaccurate insanity acquittals and to give jurors an
alternative to acquittal when mental illness is believed to play a part in an offence’); State v Hornsby 484 SE 2d
869, 872 (SC 1997) (purposes of  GBMI statute were to reduce the number of  insanity acquittals and provide
mental health care for GBMI inmates); Robinson v Solem 432 NW 2d 246, 248 (SD 1988) (‘[O]ur legislature
intended to provide an alternative verdict available to a jury to reduce the number of  offenders who were
erroneously found not guilty by reason of  insanity.’); People v Smith 465 NE 2d 101, 106 (Ill App 1984) (‘In the
instant case, the legislature intended to provide a statute that reduced the number of  persons who were
erroneously found not guilty by reason of  insanity and to characterize such defendants as in need of  treatment.’).
36 See Valerie P Hans, ‘An Analysis of  Public Attitudes toward the Insanity Defence’ (1986) 24 Criminology 393,
406; see also Eric Silver et al, ‘Demythologizing Inaccurate Perceptions of  the Insanity Defence’ (1994) 18
Law and Hum Behavior 63, 67–68.
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fraction of  a per cent of  even felony cases.37 Also contrary to popular belief, in the few
cases where an insanity plea is introduced, more than half  involve non-violent offences.38
In addition, even in the rare cases in which the insanity defence is sought, it is usually not
granted,39 yet the public perception is that it is commonly successful.40 Claims that the
defence is abused and employed to manipulate juries are also belied by the fact that most
NGRI pleas are not contested,41 and the vast majority of  NGRI verdicts – 93 per cent, in
one study – are reached through negotiated pleas or rendered by judges in bench trials,
rather than by juries.42 The evidence directly refutes fears of  rampant abuse and courtroom
manipulation; in fact, most NGRI acquittees have significant prior histories of  treatment
for mental illness.43
Protecting the public from potentially violent offenders, sane or insane, is an important,
indeed irreproachable, goal. The GBMI verdict may protect the public from some
dangerously insane offenders, but it does so not through rational reform of  civil
commitment, but rather by subverting the insanity defence and thereby perverting the
criminal justice system to condemn, through criminal conviction, violators who may be
blameless. Such condemnation of  blameless offenders may have the long-term effect of
weakening the criminal law’s moral credibility, undermining its general condemnatory force
and ability to harness the powerful forces of  social influence and internalized norms. 
The proper solution to the problem of  dangerous but insane offenders lies not in the
distortion of  criminal justice, but in the adoption of  civil commitment standards and
procedures that will adequately protect offenders and the public. While some serious
constitutional limitations on civil commitment do exist, the Supreme Court has held that the
same limitations do not apply to commitment after an acquittal based on an insanity defence.
Civil commitment after an NGRI verdict is made easier in part because the insanity
acquittee’s past offence provides evidence of  dangerousness that may not exist in the normal
civil commitment case.44 These relaxed requirements are enough to protect the community
through civil commitment without the need to distort the criminal justice process.
northern ireland legal quarterly 65(2)
37 See Lisa A Callahan et al. ‘The Volume and Characteristics of  Insanity Defence Pleas: An Eight-State Study’
(1991) 19 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry and L 331, 334. Note that this is less than 1 per cent of  all felony cases,
while the lay subjects estimated insanity pleas for 38 per cent of  all persons charged with any crime. See also
Richard A Pasewark and Hugh McGinley, ‘Insanity Plea: National Survey of  Frequency and Success’ (1985)
13 J Psychiatry and L 101 (reporting median rate of  1 plea per 873 reported crimes); Stephen G Valdes,
‘Frequency and Success: An Empirical Study of  Criminal Law Defences, Federal Constitutional Evidentiary
Claims, and Plea Negotiations’ (2005) 153 U Pa L Rev 1709 (note) (study of  400 judges, prosecutors, and
defence counsel reports insanity claims offered in less than 1 per cent of  cases).
38 See Steadman et al (n 33) 111; see also Callaham et al (n 37) 336.
39 One study reports that the average acquittal rate for an insanity plea is 26 per cent. See Callahan et al. (n 37)
334. Pasewark and McGinley report a success rate of  15 per cent of  pleas. See Pasewark and McGinley (n 37)
106; Valdes (n 37) (reporting success rate of  24 per cent).
40 See e.g. Hans (n 36) 406 (reporting study indicating that public believes over 36 per cent of  all NGRI claims,
constituting perceived 14 per cent of  all criminal cases, result in NGRI verdict); Mary Frain, ‘Professor Says
Insanity Defence Seldom Works’ Telegram and Gazette (Worcester, MA, 19 January 1996) B1 (quoting chair of
psychiatry at the University of  Massachusetts Medical Center as saying that general public believes the insanity
defence is used in 20 to 50 per cent of  all criminal cases).
41 See Michael J Perlin, ‘A Law of  Healing’ (2000) 68 University of  Cincinnati Law Review 407, 425 (‘Nearly 90%
of  all insanity defence cases are “walkthroughs” – stipulated on the papers.’).
42 See Callahan et al (n 37) 334.
43 See e.g. Michael R Hawkins and Richard A Pasewark, ‘Characteristics of  Persons Utilizing the Insanity Plea’
(1983) 53 Psychology Reports 191, 194; Steadman et al. (n 33) 56.
44 See, generally, Robinson, ‘Punishing Dangerousness’ (n 25).
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2 mental illness negating an offence element
Just as an actor’s mistake can cause her to lack the culpability required for an offence, so too
can an actor’s mental illness cause the absence of  an offence culpability requirement.45 If  an
actor is hallucinating and believes she is hitting moles, when she is in fact lethally beating her
daughter, she does not have the culpable state of  mind – knowingly causing death of  another
person – required for the offence of  murder. The hallucination induced by her mental illness
‘negates’ (shows that she did not have) the culpable state of  mind required for the offence.
Model Penal Code § 4.02 expressly authorises this use of  mental illness evidence:
Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is
admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have
a state of  mind which is an element of  the offense.
As in the case of  mistake, one might argue that there is no need for this type of  section.
Model Penal Code § 1.12(1) already provides that:
No person may be convicted of  an offense unless each element of  such offense
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of  such proof, the
innocence of  the defendant is assumed.
Thus, even absent a special provision, an actor cannot be convicted without proof  of  all
elements, and the absence of  any element – such as a culpability element, because of  mental
illness – will provide a defence. As will become apparent in the following discussion,
however, the Model Code’s provision affirmatively permitting mental illness to negate a
required culpability element was a wise addition because it would alter the previously
existing law in many jurisdictions.
This absent element defence – mental illness negating a required culpability element –
is given a special name in many jurisdictions, such as ‘diminished capacity’, ‘diminished
responsibility’, ‘partial responsibility’, or ‘partial insanity’, yet, all of  these labels can be
misleading. The terms diminished and partial suggest that the defence is designed to provide
a mitigation or partial defence, perhaps for mental illness short of  insanity. But there is
nothing partial about the defence.46 The actor’s mental illness either negates a required
element of  the offence charged or it does not. The doctrine accordingly either provides a
complete defence to the offence charged or it does not. An actor may end up with liability
for a lesser offence, of  course, if  his or her mental illness is such that it negates the
culpability of  the offence charged but not the culpability required for a lesser offence. On
the other hand, the mental illness might be such that it negates the culpability required for
all lesser offences or it might be such that it does not negate the culpability of  any offence,
including the most serious offence charged.
The latter case illustrates the important limitations of  the defence: an actor may be
seriously mentally ill yet have no diminished capacity defence if, despite mental illness, the
actor satisfies the required culpability elements of  the offence charged. Mental illness that
impairs an actor’s ability to control his or her conduct, for example, is unlikely to negate an
offence culpability requirement, because such requirements typically concern specific
cognitive functioning (for example, being aware of  facts or consequences) rather than
matters of  control. Typically, only cognitive dysfunction will cause an actor not to know the
nature, circumstances, or potential consequences of  his or her conduct, and therefore not
satisfy a culpability element.
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45 A hypothetical commonly given in the literature to illustrate this kind of  situation is the man who, because of
mental illness, believes he is squeezing a lemon when in fact he is squeezing his wife’s neck.
46 Paul H Robinson, Criminal Law Defences vol 1 (West Group 1984) § 22.
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The history of  the doctrine of  diminished capacity is for the most part the history of
attempts to limit the use of  evidence of  mental illness to negate an offence element.
American jurisdictions take a variety of  positions on the admissibility of  evidence of  mental
illness to negate an offence element. About 40 per cent of  the jurisdictions, typically those
with modern criminal codes, admit any evidence of  mental disease or defect that is relevant
to negate any culpability element of  an offence,47 as the Model Penal Code recommends.
Another 30 per cent allow such evidence to be admitted, but purport to limit such admission
to negating only ‘specific intent’48 – a concept that has little meaning in modern codes – or,
even more restrictively, to negate only the malice or premeditation element of  murder (in
jurisdictions whose definition of  murder requires such elements).49 The final 30 per cent
purport to exclude the admission of  mental-illness evidence to negate any offence element.50
While some of  these efforts have been held unconstitutional,51 the US Supreme Court in
Clark v Arizona held that the federal constitution did not require states to allow admission
of  evidence of  mental illness.52
The common law treated diminished capacity as analogous to voluntary intoxication,
where culpability was imputed to the actor. However, the analogy is flawed. The imputation
of  culpability may well be justified in the context of  voluntary intoxication; the actor has
culpably caused his own intoxication and that culpability ought to be taken into account.
Current law commonly takes this as a rationale for imputing to him recklessness as to the
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47 See Alaska Stat § 12.47.020; Ark Code Ann § 5-2-303; State v Burge 487 A 2d 532 (CT 1985); Colo Rev Stat
Ann § 18-1-803; Haw Rev Stat Ann § 704-401; Idaho Code § 18-207; Robinson v Commonwealth 569 SW 2d 183
(Ky App 1978); Me Rev Stat Ann tit 17-A § 38; Hoey v State 536 A 2d 622 (MD 1988); Mo Ann Stat § 552.030;
Mont Code Ann § 46-14-102; Finger v State 27 P 3d 66 (NV 2001) (finding abolition of  the insanity defence
unconstitutional and holding that evidence not meeting the legal insanity standard may be admitted at trial to
negate an offence element); Novosel v Helgemoe 384 A 2d 124 (NH 1978) (applying only in bifurcated trials); NJ
Stat Ann § 2C:4-2; Or Rev Stat § 161-300; State v Perry 13 SW 3d 724 (TN Crim App 1999); Utah Code Ann
§ 76-2-305; State v Smith 396 A 2d 126 (VT 1978); United States v Pohlot 827 F 2d 889 (3d Cir 1987) (holding
that in codifying an insanity excuse, 8 USCA § 17, Congress abolished defences of  ‘diminished capacity’ and
‘partial responsibility’ but did not intend to preclude admission of  psychiatric evidence relevant to negate an
element of  the offence).
48 Cal Penal Code § 28; Veverka v Cash 318 NW2d 447 (IA 1982); State v Dargatz, 614 P 2d 430 (KS 1980); People
v Atkins 325 NW 2d 38 (MI App 1982); People v Segal 429 NE 2d 107 (NY 1981); Commonwealth v Walzack 360
A 2d 914 (PA 1976); State v Correra 430 A 2d 1251 (RI 1981); State v Huber 356 NW 2d 468 (SD 1984); State v
Bottrell 14 P 3d 164 (WA App 2000).
49 People v Leppert 434 NE 2d 21 (Ill App 1982) (considering defendant’s claim that, due to mental defect, he
lacked the requisite intent to attempt murder); Commonwealth v Baldwin 686 NE 2d 1001 (MA 1997); Washington
v State 85 NW 2d 509 (NE 1957); State v Beach 699 P 2d 115 (NM 1985); State v Shank 367 SE 2d 639 (NC
1988); LeVasseur v Commonwealth 304 SE 2d 202 (VA 1979).
50 Barnett v State 540 So 2d 810 (AL Crim App 1988); State v Schantz 403 P 2d 521 (AZ 1965); Bates v State 386 A
2d 1139 (DE 1978); Bethea v United States 365 A 2d 64 (DC 1976); Zamora v State 361 So 2d 776 (FL App 1978);
Hudson v State 319 SE 2d 28 (GA App 1984); Brown v State 448 NE2d 10 (IN 1983); State v Murray 375 So 2d
80 (LA 1979); State v Bouwman 328 NW 2d 703 (MN 1982); Garcia v State 828 So 2d 1279 (Miss App 2002);
State v Wilcox 438 NE2d 523 (Ohio 1982); Gresham v State 489 P 2d 1355 (Okla Crim App 1971); Gill v State
552 SE 2d 26 (SC 2001); Warner v State 944 SW 2d 812 (TX App 1997); State v Flint 96 SE 2d 677 (WV 1957)
(providing statement against diminished capacity defence, which has since been questioned but not overruled,
in State v Simmon 309 SE 2d 89 (WV 1983)); Muench v Israel 715 F 2d 1124 (7th Cir1983) (finding that Wisconsin
may constitutionally reject the diminished capacity defence and refuse to admit evidence proving defendant’s
inability to form requisite intent); Price v State 807 P 2d 909 (WY 1991). To date, North Dakota courts have
not explicitly spoken to this issue – their position remains unclear.
51 See e.g. Hendershott v People 653 P 2d 385 (CO 1982) (finding unconstitutional Colorado statute barring
evidence of  mental illness to negate mens rea requirement for nonspecific intent crimes); Finger (n 47) (holding
Nevada statute unconstitutional). But see Muench (n 50) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to Wisconsin’s
practice of  excluding evidence of  mental illness relevant to a mens rea requirement).
52 Clark v Arizona 548 US 735 (2006).
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objective elements of  an offence, for example. While one may question some aspects of  this
rationale for imputing culpability, it provides at least the semblance of  a rational reason. 
No similar claim can be made in the context of  mental illness negating an offence
element. An actor is rarely to blame for causing his own mental disease or defect. What,
then, is the rationale for treating the mentally ill actor as if  he has a required culpability
when in fact he does not? As with all doctrines of  imputation, the process of  imputation in
itself  is not objectionable (this is the basis for complicity liability, for example), but it may
become so if  not adequately justified.
One form of  attack on the use of  mental-illness evidence to negate an offence
element is to claim incompatibility between behavioural science and criminal law. It is
argued, for example, that behavioural science admits gradations of  responsibility while
the criminal law does not; it must decide to impose liability or not.53 But this argument
rests upon a mistaken view of  the diminished capacity defence. As noted above, the
actor’s mental illness either negates an offence element or it does not; it does not ask the
criminal law to admit of  gradations. 
Another argument is that the behavioural sciences are not yet sophisticated enough for
the criminal law to rely upon them. A similar argument stresses the tendency of  the
diminished capacity doctrine to take ‘full decision-making authority’ from the jury and shift
it to the expert witness.54 But what is asked is not to have criminal law rely on behavioural
science; what is asked is that juries be given access to such evidence along with all other
relevant evidence, so the jury can decide whether the required offence mental element is
present. The jury has full authority to reject any psychiatric evidence (and is particularly
likely to do so where psychiatrists disagree, as frequently occurs).55
Another challenge to allowing mental illness to negate culpability focuses on the nature
of  culpability: it is a legal (and moral) concept, not a scientific one. Accordingly, it is argued,
culpability must necessarily be decided on an objective standard, and application of  an
objective standard means that personal abnormalities cannot be taken into account.56 While
this view of  culpability might have been true at early common law, it does not accurately
describe the nature of  current doctrine. It is true that an actor’s state of  mind cannot be
known directly, and it is true that culpability must be proven by objective evidence. However,
this does not demand an objective standard for culpability. Current law rejects such common
law rules as the presumption that ‘an actor intends the natural and probable consequences
of  his conduct’.57 It requires instead a finding by the jury that, based on all the evidence, the
jury believes that the actor actually had the culpable state of  mind required by the offence
definition. The members of  the jury may call upon their own life experiences in reaching
their factual conclusions, including judgments about how people normally function. But the
issue they are asked to decide is not whether the ordinary person would have had the required
culpable state of  mind, but rather whether this defendant actually did have it.
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53 See Bethea (n 50). Following an argument with his estranged wife, defendant shot her five times at close range;
at trial defendant claimed at the time of  the shooting his mental condition was such as to preclude a finding
of  ‘sound memory and discretion’ and ‘deliberate and premeditated malice’ as required for the offence.
54 Ibid 89.
55 For a discussion of  the role of  experts and the jury in applying the insanity defence, see Brawner (n 15).
56 See ibid 1002.
57 See, for example, Regina v Wallett [1968] All ER 296 (the Criminal Justice Act of  1967 excluded common law
presumption; jury instruction on ordinary person standard for determining intent in murder case was in
violation of  Act; murder conviction reduced to manslaughter); Sandstrom v Montana 442 US 510 99 S Ct 2450,
61 L Ed 2d 39 (1979) (jury instruction in accordance with common law presumption had effect of  either
conclusive presumption of  intent or shift of  burden of  persuasion, and therefore unconstitutional because
violates 14th Amendment requirement that state prove every offence element beyond reasonable doubt).
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One final form of  challenge, to some the most persuasive arguments against permitting
mental illness to negate an element, focuses on the need to protect society from the
mentally ill person who commits a crime. We must bar the defence of  diminished capacity
because such a dangerous person must be convicted of  something in order to provide
authority for incarceration or treatment or whatever else is necessary to prevent him from
causing further harm. Further, the danger to the public in permitting such a defence is
particularly high because everyone who commits a brutal offence suffers some degree of
mental abnormality, so allowing such a defence would frustrate the needed criminal law
jurisdiction over those from whom we most need to protect ourselves. 
Even if  it were true that everyone who commits a brutal offence is mentally abnormal,
it does not follow that all such persons will get a defence of  this sort. Only those who are
mentally ill and, as a result, do not have a required offence element, are entitled to a defence for
mental illness negating an element. Further, ‘mental illness’ typically is defined expressly to
exclude abnormality manifested only by anti-social conduct. Most important, the proper
way to protect ourselves from dangerous mentally ill people is not through distortion of  the
criminal law system by convicting blameless people, but rather through providing an
effective system for civil commitment of  the dangerously mentally ill.58 (Note that this
protection-of-the-public line of  argument would call for abolition of  not only the use of
mental illness negating an element, but also of  the insanity defence.)
Some courts have concluded that barring the use of  mental illness evidence to show the
absence of  a required offence element is unconstitutional.59 This is said to follow from the
cases holding that the state is constitutionally required to prove all elements of  an offence
beyond a reasonable doubt. Such a constitutional rule may be broader than is appropriate;
it would seem to bar all forms of  imputation of  a required offence element. Many doctrines
of  imputation – such as the doctrine of  complicity, which imputes the conduct of  another
– are well justified and universally accepted. If  there is to be a constitutional rule, it ought
to focus instead upon the adequacy of  the justification for the imputation. Given the
difficulty in showing a basis of  blameworthiness of  an actor whose mental illness negates
an offence element, imputation of  the negated element seems unwise. Whether the
rejection of  such bad policy ought to be enshrined as a constitutional rule is another matter.
3 extreme mental or emotional disturbance manslaughter
Criminal homicide occurs when one culpably ‘causes the death of  another human being’.60
For murder liability to arise, causing death must be the actor’s ‘conscious object’ (purpose),
or he must be ‘practically certain’ (knowing) that his conduct will cause death.61 Some codes
limit murder to the intentional (purposeful) form.62
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58 See Paul H Robinson, Distributive Principles of  Criminal Law (OUP 2008) ch 6; Paul H Robinson, ‘Punishing
Dangerousness’ (n 25); Brawner (n 15) 1429.
59 See, for example, Hendershott (n 51) (denial of  defendant’s request to present mental impairment evidence to
negate requisite culpability held violation of  due process; exclusion of  mental impairment evidence rendered
prosecution’s mens rea evidence uncontestable as matter of  law and lessened prosecution’s burden to
something less than mandated by due process). The US Supreme Court has not yet taken a position on the
issue. Some federal circuit courts have held, however, that it is a violation of  due process if  jury instructions
put the burden to prove mental illness on the defendant where the jury might conclude that this relieves the
state of  proving all required culpability elements. Humanik v Beyer 871 F 2d 432 (3rd Cir) cert denied, 493 US
812 (1989). 
60 Model Penal Code § 210.1(1).
61 See Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a)(i) and (b)(ii) (defining purposely and knowingly as to a result).
62 See e.g. NY Penal Code § 125.25(1) (‘intent’); Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2903.02(A) (‘purposely’). Some of  these
states do not refer to ‘knowing’ killings, but define murder also to include some non-intentional killings, such
as the depraved indifference category. See e.g. NY Penal Code § 125.25(2).
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A common exception to the paradigm of  an intentional killing as murder is found in the
common law doctrine of  provocation, under which intentional killings would be mitigated
from murder to the lesser crime of  manslaughter – specifically, what is commonly known as
voluntary manslaughter – if  the killer was ‘provoked’ into committing the crime. The mitigation
reflected the position that passion frequently obscures reason and, in some limited way, renders
the provoked intentional killer less blameworthy than the unprovoked intentional killer.
Modern codes, following the Model Penal Code, give a broader mitigation than the
common law provocation doctrine. The Model Penal Code’s manslaughter mitigation
applies where:
murder is committed under the influence of  extreme mental or emotional disturbance for
which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of  such explanation
or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of  a person in the actor’s
situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.63
This modern formulation certainly covers all cases in which the common law would have
given a mitigation, but goes much further, to provide a much broader basis for the
mitigation. 
The doctrine has two components. First, the killing must have been committed ‘under
the influence of  extreme mental or emotional disturbance’. A defendant will not be eligible
for the mitigation if  he did not personally suffer such a disturbance or if  it did not drive or
dictate his act, even if  the circumstances would have created such a disturbance in most
other people and would have driven them to violence. Second, there must be a ‘reasonable
explanation or excuse’ for the disturbance. No mitigation is available if  the disturbance has
no reasonable basis or is peculiar to the actor.64
The Model Penal Code broadens the common law mitigation in several important respects.
Unlike the common law rules, it does not explicitly require, or exclude, particular situations;
there are no conditions that are inadequate as a matter of  law to provide a mitigation. It also
drops the common law rule barring the mitigation if  the killing occurs some period of  time
after the provoking event. In other words, the Code postulates that an actor’s mental or
emotional disturbance does not necessarily decrease with time; indeed, it might increase.65
Further, nothing in the Code’s mitigation limits it to cases where the actor kills the source
of  the provocation, as the common law does. The Code’s position is that if  the actor’s killing
is less blameworthy by virtue of  the influencing conditions, then such reduced
blameworthiness exists no matter who is killed. Indeed, the Code does not even require a
provoking act as such; the relevant ‘disturbance’ may arise from any source so long as it
satisfies the rule’s requirements. (The underlying theory of  this version of  the mitigation
does not appear to be one related to a possible partial justification. Defensive force defences,
for example, may justify force against an aggressor but not against anyone else.66 The
mitigation’s basis, rather, is more akin to excuse defences, which look to the actor rather than
the objective circumstances and apply regardless of  the identity of  the offence’s victim.)67
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63 Model Penal Code § 210.3(1)(b).
64 See e.g. People v Casassa 404 NE 2d 1310 (NY 1980) (trial court found defendant acted under required
disturbance but no reasonable explanation or excuse for it, thus denied mitigation; affirmed on appeal).
65 Model Penal Code § 210.3 comment at 48 (Tentative Draft No 9, 1959).
66 In some provocation situations, of  course, an actor may also have a self-defence claim.
67 For an illustrative application of  the Model Penal Code’s extreme emotional disturbance test, see e.g. State v
Ott 686 P 2d 1001 (OR 1984) (defendant’s conviction for murder of  wife reversed and new trial ordered
because trial judge failed to permit jury to consider the ‘personal’ characteristics of  defendant; extreme
emotional disturbance must be judged from perspective of  actor’s situation).
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68 As the Model Penal Code commentary explains: ‘There is an inevitable ambiguity in “situation.” If  the actor
were blind or if  he had just suffered a blow or experienced a heart attack, these would certainly be facts to be
considered in a judgment involving criminal liability, as they would be under traditional law. But the heredity,
intelligence or temperament of  the actor would not be held material in judging negligence, and could not be
without depriving the criterion of  all its objectivity. The code is not intended to displace discriminations of
this kind, but rather to leave the issue to the courts.’ Model Penal Code § 2.02 comment 4 (1985) 242. See also
State v Ott (n 67) (noting that a similar problem exists with recklessness, and that discriminations similar to
those required by the negligence standard must be made).
69 See Model Penal Code (n 68)
70 Ibid.
The Model Penal Code mitigation uses a ‘reasonableness’ standard, as the common law
doctrine does, but instead of  adopting a purely objective understanding of  reasonableness,
modern rules partially individualise the standard through the requirement that the
reasonableness of  the explanation or excuse is to be determined ‘under the circumstances
as [the actor] believes them to be’ and ‘from the viewpoint of  a person in the actor’s
situation’. These two phrases provide significant opportunities for a court, or jury, to take
account of  the particular characteristics of  the defendant and the specific conditions in
which the defendant acted. The Code’s drafters intended the second phrase – in particular
‘in the actor’s situation’ – to permit a trial judge great leeway in partially individualising the
reasonable-person standard.68
Most of  the applications of  the mitigation will not involve mental illness; the majority
will concern the classic cases of  emotional rage or distress. But by broadening the
mitigation to ‘extreme mental or emotional disturbance’, the modern formulation allows
mental illness to be taken into account. This will include cases that previously would have
gone under the label of  ‘diminished responsibility’ or something of  the sort.69 It was
common for states to allow this mental-illness mitigation to reduce first-degree murder
(which often required premeditation) to second-degree murder, but only a minority took the
Model Penal Code’s approach of  allowing it to mitigate murder to manslaughter.70
conclusion
Here, then, are three kinds of  doctrines that can allow mental illness to provide a mitigation
or excuse under US criminal law, either by satisfying the special requirements of  the extreme-
mental-or-emotional-disturbance mitigation of  murder to manslaughter, by negating a
required offence culpability element, or by satisfying the conditions of  a general insanity
defence. In each instance, there is great variation in how the states formulate the doctrine.
The most that can be said is that nearly all states have a general insanity defence, the majority
of  states allow mental illness to negate at least some offence elements, and most states allow
some forms of  mental illness to provide some kind of  mitigation to murder.
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